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DURING POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION: 
A Monopsony Approach to the Status of Latvia’s Russian Minority  
 
Abstract  
 
Conv entional wisdom suggests that during communism, tastes for 
discrimination were suppressed.  In partial explanation for ethnic tensions 
observed following central planning, economic liberalization allows those 
tastes to be expressed. This paper explores the  feasibility of monopsony as 
an economic structure supportive of discrimination during transition, using 
Latvia’s ethnic Russians as a case study. Measuring employment 
concentration and earnings differentials across regions, monopsony appears 
prevalent in  the country.  A monopsony explanation requires Russians to 
have lower labor supply elasticity than Latvians, a condition which 
estimates for participation probability confirm.  Earnings decompositions 
show that though Russians are paid more than Latvians o n average, given 
their human capital characteristics, they suffer earnings discrimination of 
between 5.5 and 7.3 percent.  In addition, compared with Latvians the 
likelihood that Russians will be unemployed is greater, though Russians are 
less likely to re gister for unemployment services.  This evidence suggests 
that the lack of integrated, flexible labor markets in Latvia, and the 
monopsony which results, have supported labor market discrimination 
against Russians during transition.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Ce ntral and Eastern Europe, political events suggest ethnic tension accompanies 
economic transition.  From the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia to questions about minority 
citizenship rights in the Baltic states, disputes based on ethnicity appear more prev alent since 
central planners no longer officially pronounce the shared interests of all workers.  If the strictures 
of central planning suppressed the expression of many tastes, excess demand for those tastes were 
likely pent - up.  One of the prime benefits  of economic liberalization is that it allows people to act 
according to their preferences.  However, conventional wisdom suggests that ethnic tension has 
erupted following communism largely because majority populations express their tastes for       2
discriminat ion against minorities.  A comprehensive examination of ethnic tension would naturally 
invoke historical, sociological and political insights.  This paper will focus on what economics can 
offer a discussion of these issues.  Specifically, it will consider  the relation between earnings 
discrimination and imperfectly competitive market structures during transition.  
A well - developed literature discusses the theory of discrimination in market - based 
economies. Classic work (Becker (1957)) frames the problem in t erms of prejudicial tastes. In a 
perfectly competitive market, employers with such tastes would pay for them with lower profits.  
In the long - term, market forces would eliminate discriminating firms.  This approach based on 
perfect competition and tastes f or discrimination dominates the literature.  However, it likely has 
limited applicability to analysis of post - Communist ethnic tension in the short term, where perfect 
competition obtains only in very limited situations.   
Absent perfect competition, an alt ernative branch of the literature outlines how  
discrimination can be sustained.  Building on Robinson (1934), it concentrates on how 
monopsony allows wage discrimination, defined as payment below labor’s marginal revenue 
product.  In monopsony, single buy ers offer wages below the worker’s marginal revenue product, 
which could account for discrimination against certain groups.  However, industrial country 
empirical evidence has not supported the monopsony model as a central explanation for wage 
discriminati on.  Monopsony is unlikely to prevail in these settings and estimated labor supply 
elasticities run counter to this model’s stipulations.  
In contrast to industrialized countries, post - communist economies exhibit characteristics 
appropriate to a monopsony e xplanation for discrimination. A caricature of central planning 
would portray the economy as having a single employer, the state.  While the comparative 
systems literature suggests that labor markets were much more competitive under Communism       3
than this ext reme (see Bergson (1944) for a classic presentation), many local labor markets were 
dominated by single large firms introduced and maintained by central - planners.  These firms 
would likely enjoy local monopsony power.  During Communism restrictions on mobi lity within 
the country would reinforce these monopsonies.  
Historical monopsonies likely persist through transition.  While new firms eventually enter 
isolated labor markets, the pace at which monopsonies disband is slow and erratic, particularly 
given reg ional disparities in investment and growth following Communism.  In addition, official 
measures, such as continued geographic restrictions on workers’ movement, and structural 
problems, such as inadequately developed housing markets, limit mobility into an d out of 
segmented labor markets.  As a result of these institutional factors, the monopsony explanation 
might have particular resonance for an analysis of post - Communist labor market discrimination.  
This paper will examine labor market discrimination duri ng post - Communist transition, 
taking as a case study Latvia and its ethnic Russian minority.  It will examine indicators of 
monopsony prevalence in Latvia.  Since labor supply elasticity is central to the monopsony 
approach and its applicability, the paper  will estimate labor supply elasticities across ethnic 
groups, ascertaining whether the group proportedly discriminated against has lower elasticity.  
Having established that a monopsony approach is potentially relevant, it will test for earnings 
different ials across groups that cannot be explained by factors directly related to productivity 
using classic decomposition techniques developed by Oaxaca (1973).  Moving beyond wage 
discrimination, it will consider differences in unemployment across groups.  Comp arisons of ILO 
standard unemployment rates and officially reported unemployment rates, which are based on 
registration for benefits, suggest that official statistics underrepresent ethnic differences. To 
isolate possible ethnicity bias in unemployment and  registration, the paper then analyzes the       4
probability of becoming unemployed and of registering for benefits, correcting for observed 
characteristics.  
The analysis proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on discrimination and 
on labor marke ts during transition.  Section III presents a model of discrimination based on 
monopsony and describes the paper’s empirical strategy. Section IV summarizes empirical results 
concerning the viability of a monopsony approach to wage and unemployment bias ag ainst 
Latvia’s Russians.  Section V concludes.  
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economics defines discrimination as paying workers less than their marginal product based 
on characteristics with no relation to productivity.  A well - developed theoretical literature 
pr esents two central approaches to analyzing wage discrimination, The more prevalent strand 
builds on Becker (1957), which established a framework of tastes for discrimination.  With perfect 
competition and differing degrees of prejudicial tastes, employers  with the least tastes for 
discrimination hire members of the minority group, paying them lower wages than equally well -
qualified non - minorities.  As payment for their tastes, these employers enjoy higher profits than 
those with greater taste for discrimina tion.  Over time, profit - seeking capital increases the 
productive capacity and employment of the least prejudicial firms.  Tastes for discrimination tend 
to disappear with bankruptcy for those with discriminatory tastes and the entry of entrepreneurial 
emp loyers seeking profits arising from less prejudice.  According to this framework, tastes for 
discrimination and lower wages for minority groups could persist where firm entry and 
entrepreneurial skills are inelastically supplied, both characteristics that  likely obtain during post -
communist transition.        5
  Another branch of research discusses the potential for discrimination absent perfect 
competition.  Robinson (1934) presented the classic model of monopsony and discrimination: 
with the ability to set prices,  a single buyer of labor can offer wages below workers’ marginal 
product.  Madden (1973) updated and summarizes this approach, though Cain (1986) discusses 
its empirical difficulties. If monopsony is to generate lower wages for discriminated groups, those 
groups should have lower labor supply elasticity.  But evidence suggests that, even though 
holding productivity constant US women are less - well paid, they have higher elasticity.  
Moreover, labor market integration has diminished the prevalence of monopson y in the US, while 
measured discrimination continues.   
Despite these difficulties, Sharir (1995) evaluates how the literature has put less emphasis 
on the monopsony approach to gender discrimination than the approach merits.  Several authors 
have considere d monopsony in specific labor markets.  Using historical evidence, Fishback (1998) 
relies upon monopsony to analyze American labor markets in the early 1900s.  Ransom (1993) 
explores university monopsony power to discuss payments to seniority in academia.  
More recent theoretical work seeks to expand upon the monopsony and Beckerian taste 
approaches to discrimination.  Kolpin and Singell (1997) rely upon asymmetric information to 
describe the possibility of discrimination, while Naylor (1996) attribute it to  asymmetric collusion 
in the presence of employer power.  Gottfries and McCormick (1995) consider the link between 
discrimination and unemployment by focusing on segmented labor markets.  
If the theoretical work on discrimination presents competing approach es,  empirical work 
to measuring the degree of wage discrimination is based primarily on Oaxaca (1973) or 
elaborations thereon.  As described in Section III below, this approach decomposes wage       6
differences into those attributable to measurable human capita l factors and those due to 
discrimination based on gender or ethnicity.   
The empirical microeconomic literature on labor markets in transition economies considers 
changing wage structures during and after communism and the effects on unemployment of labor 
market support policies.  For example, Brainard (1998) analyzes the winners and losers from the 
early years of Russia’s economic transition, decomposing the wage effects of human capital and 
unmeasured skill for men and women.  Chase (1998) compares earnin gs information during 
Communism and that from early transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, making use of the 
split of these two previously joined republics to link the rapidity of transition policies to changed 
wage structures.    
While these papers  consider the gender earnings differentials and find them to be 
increasing with time, little research directly considers earnings discrimination by ethnicity in 
transition economies.  One exception is Kroncke and Smith (1999), who evaluate the degree of 
ea rnings discrimination against Russians in Estonia. Using classic decomposition techniques, they 
find no evidence of discrimination against Russians in 1989 but significant discrimination in 1994.  
However, Kroncke and Smith (1999) do not explicitly relate  economic characteristics prevalent 
following central planning to explain this wage discrimination.  
III.  THEORY AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Monopsony and Discrimination  
Approaching ethnic discrimination primarily based upon monopsony, it is useful to review 
the  theory of how this market structure leads workers of one ethnic group to be paid less than 
their marginal product.  A profit maximizing monopsonist hires labor until workers’ marginal 
product and marginal factor cost are equal.  Her monopsony power allows  her to pay wages       7
below this marginal factor cost.  Wage discrimination results, though its extent depends inversely 
upon labor supply elasticity.  
Somewhat more formally, in a given labor market the monopsonist faces the upward -
sloping labor supply  L(w)  wi th elasticity  e.  If the inverse labor supply is  w(L) , its first derivative 
with respect to  L, w’(L)  will be inversely proportional to  e.  Given total factor cost of labor which 
is  TFC = w(L)L,  marginal factor cost is  MFC = w’(L)L + w(L).  The cost - minimizi ng monopsonist 
will hire labor  L*  such that the value of the marginal product of labor ( VMP ) equals the marginal 
factor cost  (MFC).    
[1]   VMP = MFC =   w’(L*)L* + w*(L*)  
Monopsony power allows the firm to offer a wage below the VMP.  The degree of difference 
depends on:  
  [2]    VMP  -  w*(L*) =   w’(L*)L*   
Because w’(L) is inversely proportional to labor supply elasticity as the derivative of the inverse 
labor supply curve, the smaller the elasticity of labor supply  e, the greater the difference between 
VMP  and the  offered wage and the greater the wage discrimination.  
Measuring Monopsony  
To apply a monopsony approach to ethnic discrimination following communism, it is 
important to establish the existence of monopsony in local labor markets.  Several institutional 
fac tors suggest that individual buyers of labor might exercise monopsony power in specific labor 
markets and that workers cannot move easily to other labor markets.  Throughout transition 
economies, large regional disparities in unemployment exist ( e.g ., Ham,  Svejnar, and Terrell 
(1998) analyze the disparities in the Czech Republic). Where single industries dominated labor 
markets during central planning, during transition a limited number of firms likely dominating       8
Latvia’s local labor markets.  These communi st - era firms, or those that succeeded them during 
privatization, would likely still exercise monopsony power.  
If workers can move to other labor markets, then a single dominant demander of labor 
need not indicate monopsony.  Several facets of Latvia’s tran sition hinder labor mobility.  
Officially, workers need to have a stamp in their internal passbooks designating where they are 
allowed to live and work.  While these stipulations might not bind universally, their existence 
points to limitations on labor mo bility.  Further, because the Latvian housing market has not been 
privatized, it is difficult for workers interested in moving to different areas to find permanent 
accomodation.  Latvian monopsonies likely persist given the continuing existence of dominant  
employers in local labor markets and of constraints on local mobility.    
Seeking empirical evidence of Latvian monopsony, the paper explores two alternative 
indicators, one direct based on employment concentration, the other indirect based on regional 
wag e differentials.   To exercise monopsony power, a firm must face few other competitors for 
labor in local markets. Labor markets where most workers are employed by a limited number of 
firms are potentially monopsonistic.  The paper first presents evidence  on employment 
concentration, defined by the percentage of workers in local labor markets who are employed in 
specific industries.  
For monopsonistic labor markets to exist, there must be restrictions on labor mobility that 
keep workers from moving to areas  with other employers that offer non - discriminatory wages. In 
an integrated labor market, after correcting for all other individual characteristics, the location of 
ones job should not influence wages: those differences should be arbitraged away. The magnit ude 
of the regional disparities, as measured by coefficients on regional dummies, indicates the degree 
to which individual labor markets are segmented, and by extension, the degree of monopsony       9
prevalent in different geographic areas. While some of those r egional wage differences will reflect 
alternative costs of living, in the absence of labor mobility, real earnings differences will persist, 
after correcting for human capital characteristics.    
As an indirect indicator of monopsony in Latvia, we analyze t he structure of earnings in 
the Latvian labor market. Using data on earnings and human capital characteristics, the paper 
presents ordinary least squares regressions on log earnings following Mincer (1974), including in 
the analysis regional indicator vari ables.   
[3]   LnW i =  a +  bX i +  dR i +  ei  
Because of a broad human capital literature which has established their different earnings 
structures, men and women are treated separately. The aggregate wage effects  d of region  R  
provide an indicator of the degree o f monopsony in Latvia.   
Beyond allowing this measure of regional disparity, these earnings regressions serve a 
second function.  With information about earnings structure and individual characteristics 
(education, age, gender, nationality, etc.), we have a n estimate of the returns to different observed 
characteristics in the labor market.  With this information about payments to these observable 
traits, we can predict the wages of all people, regardless of whether they actually worked.  These 
predicted earn ings are useful for analyzing the effect of offered wages on labor supply and 
unemployment.  
Measuring Relative Labor Supply Elasticities  
 
  To use a monopsony approach to discrimination, one must establish not only the existence 
of monopsony, but also test  whether the group purportedly discriminated against has lower labor 
supply elasticity than the majority group.  Based on predicted earnings, we obtain estimates of       10
labor supply elasticity.  Because of data difficulties measuring continuous labor supply ind icators 
such as hours worked, the more discrete measure of labor force participation is used.  Elasticities 
result from the probit coefficient on (predicted) earnings.  The probit estimate takes the form:  
[4]   ) ( ) Pr( i i i i Z W S e b g a + + + F =  
where the coefficient  b is taken as an estimate of the labor supply elasticity.  Interaction terms for 
those of Russian ethnicity establish the relative earnings elasticity of this group with respect to the 
Latvian majority.  
Oaxaca Earnings Decomposition  
Through a careful decomp osition of these earnings differences based on Oaxaca (1973), 
we consider the sources and degree of earnings discrimination in the Latvian economy. Using 
earnings regressions in a form presented in [3], though stratifying this data not by gender but by 
eth nicity, we can establish the geometric mean earnings for Latvians and Russians:  
  [5]     R R R L L L X W and X W b b = =  
The gross (unadjusted) logarithmic wage differential results from the difference between these 
geometric mean wages by group:  
  [6]     R R L L R L X X W W b b - = - ) ln( ) ln(  
However, any gross wage differential could be due to differences between the groups’ 
mean level of observable characteristics (such as more experience or more relevant education).  If 
those characteristics allow one group to be more productive th an another, then some of this 
earnings differential can be explained as payments for higher productivity.  
In the decomposition analysis, one assumes that some earnings structure represents 
payments to characteristics based entirely on worker productivity.  Each group’s actual earnings       11
are compared to the earnings they would receive if paid strictly according to this non -
discriminatory measure of productivity.  We attribute the difference between actual and predicted 
earnings to discrimination (in the event t hat actual earnings are below predicted earnings) or 
favoritism (in the event that actual earnings are above predicted earnings).  Because a prime 
difficulty is to determine the non - discriminatory earnings structure, most studies treat one group’s 
earnings  structure as based strictly on productivity and then test the converse, treating the other 
group’s earnings structure as strictly based on productivity.  Because the “true” productivity 
valuation is assumed to be bracketed between these two extremes, the  true index of discrimination 
should fall between those generated by relying one group’s structures.  
  [7]    
) ( ) ln( ) ln(
) ( ) ln( ) ln(
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Unemployment differentials  
To augment this analysis of wage differentials, the paper also considers potential bias in 
unemploy ment.  Many transition economies report unemployment rates based on who registers 
for unemployment
1 . After comparing unemployment rates across different ethnic groups 
according to alternative definitions, the study explores the individual characteristics a ssociated 
with higher probability of being unemployed.    
[8]   ) ( ) Pr( i i i X S U e b a + + F =  
                                                  
1  In fac t, much of the literature on unemployment during transition is based on these officially reported figures for 
unemployment, figures based on administrative data of who registers for benefits.  In early transition, these data 
were all that were available, f or ILO standard unemployment figures, based on who is not currently working and 
has actively looked for a job in the past 14 days, requires extensive labor force survey information.  In early 
transition, the costs of conducting such surveys was prohibitive .  However, though many countries including Latvia 
have collected data allowing ILO standard unemployment statistics to be published, many still offically report the 
registration - based statistics.        12
Estimating these parameters allows one to identify the risk factors for unemployment, including 
gender, education, nationality, and location.  Further, the paper estimates  equation [8] for 
alternative definitions of unemployment,  i.e.,  the standard ILO definition versus those indicating 
who registers as unemployed with the state employment service.  The difference offers insight into 
how a non - standard definition of unemplo yed masks some aspects of the Latvia’s true 
unemployment situation.  
When comparing the marginal effects of different characteristics, the common practice 
with probit analysis is to present the amount that the probability of an outcome, becoming 
unemployed  in this case, changes with a change in characteristics.  These marginal effects need to 
be reported with respect to some starting - point probability. Convention suggests using the 
probability estimates for an “average” person as a starting point for these m arginal effects, where 
an average person has characteristics equal to the sample mean.  However, it is then difficult to 
compare marginal effects of characteristics across different samples. Because samples have 
different probabilities at their means, slop es are evaluated at different starting points on a non -
linear cumulative density function.  Marginal effects are difficult to compare.  
To facilitate comparison of marginal effects across different groups with different base 
probabilities, this analysis eva luates all the marginal effects based on a common starting point on 
the normal cumulative density function. It establishes one group’s probability of being 
unemployed as the standard.  Then, marginal effects of different characteristics are calculated 
from  that same point on the CDF.   For continuous variables, the marginal difference is:  
[9]     ( ) c r r
c
c B X
x
S U
b f ￿ =
¶
¶ ) Pr(
       13
where r subscripts stand for the reference group and c subscripts stand for the comparison group.  
For discrete variables, the marginal effect s with respect to the comparison probability are:   
  [10]   ( ) ( ) r r r r c r r r r x c x B X x B X S U
c
b b b - F - - - F = D
=1 ) Pr(  
While having the detrimental effect of not having each probability calculated according to 
the actual point on the CDF which obtains for a given group, this procedure has the  benefit of 
allowing more clear comparisons between the marginal effects of characteristics across groups.   
To buttress this analysis of different unemployment definitions, a separate probit sheds 
light on who of the unemployed according to the ILO definiti on was also able to register as 
unemployed with the State Employment Service. Taking those who are unemployed according to 
the ILO standard as the population, this probit presents information about the factors which 
increase the probability that an unemplo yed person registers for benefits.  
Data Available   
To carry out this empirical analysis, the study uses three data sources. The Latvian 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) from the first quarter of 1997
2  is used to analyze the structure 
of earnings and predict h ow much people would expect to receive given their personal 
characteristics and location.  When analyzing Latvian labor force participation and unemployment, 
the paper focuses on Labor Force Survey micro - data from the first quarter of 1998 (LFS 98).  To 
of fer some information about trends in these labor market outcomes, the paper compares these 
1998 participation and unemployment findings with similar Labor Force Survey data collected in 
the second quarter of 1996 (LFS 96).   
                                                  
2  I would like to thank Mr. Robert Ackland for extracting a  sub - set of the HBS data including information on 
wages and relevant independent variables.        14
Table 1 presents descriptive sta tistics about the primary individual - level variables used in 
the analysis.  Along with information about human capital, marital status and region, Table 1 
offers information about nationality.  In 1998, the population consists of roughly 62 percent 
Latvian s, 27 percent Russians, and 11 percent people of other nationalities.  In 1996, the 
percentage of Latvians was lower, at roughly 59 percent.  Between 1996 and 1998 the share of 
non - Latvians in the country declined, perhaps because of emigration.  
Because th e HBS collected different information than the two LFS sources, it is worth 
drawing attention to difficulties comparing the three data sets presented in Table 1.  Because the 
HBS data is comprised of people reporting non - zero wages from a main job, the 933  women and 
914 men are not a random sample of the Latvian population but are selected because they work.  
As a result, their individual characteristics are not comparable with the respondents from the LFS 
surveys
3 , which consist of random samples of the wh ole population.    
For example, among people in the HBS who work, the average age is 40 years.  In the 
entire Latvian population, the average age is 47.7 years for women and 43.6 years for men.
4    
Educational attainment is higher in the HBS data ( e.g ., 25 p ercent of women have higher 
education in the HBS data, though only 12 percent do in the LFS 98 data).  The HBS and LFS 
surveys also used different categories to describe educational attainment: the HBS data 
distinguishes five categories, while the LFS data  contains eight.  This poses a problem for using 
the characteristics of the HBS data to predict the earnings of those included in the LFS (the 
rationale for which is described below).  However, for predicting earnings it is possible to collapse 
the LFS dat a into five categories comparable to those used in the HBS.  Those LFS respondents 
                                                  
3  When one selects from the LFS '98 and LFS '96 only those people who are currently working, the demographic 
characteristics are roughly comparable to the HBS sampl e.        15
who reported having “Secondary Specialized”, “Technical Secondary”, or “Comprehensive 
Secondary” education are grouped into the “Secondary Education” category when being 
com pared with the HBS data.   
IV.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Monopsony Indicators  
Offering some indication of the prevalence of monopsony in Latvia, Table 2 contains 
summary statistics about employment concentration. Because of the stipulation that officially one 
mus t have a stamp in ones passbook certifying ones ability to live and work in a particular 
administrative district, for these indicators we consider as a separate labor market each of Latvia’s 
32 administrative districts
5 .  In each of these local labor marke ts, we tabulate the industry in which 
workers were employed according to two digit standard industry codes.  Table 2 reports the 
percentage of non - farming workers employed by the most prevalent types of industry.  
In the average local Latvian labor market,  48.0 percent of workers are employed by the 
three most prevalent industries in the district, 36.0 percent work for the two most prevalent, and 
21.5 percent for the most prevalent industry.  While the average degree of employment 
concentration is quite high , there is significant dispersion in its concentration across labor 
markets.  For example, in one labor market, 32.7 percent of all workers are employed by the same 
industry.  While difficult evaluate their relative magnitude, these employment concentratio n 
figures suggest dominant employers in many local labor markets, employers likely to exercise 
monopsony power.  
                                                                                                                                                            
4  While the rest of the LFS analysis uses sample weights to ensure that the information represents the Latvian 
population, these descriptive statistics are unweighted to show the characteristics of the sample itself.  
5  For the purposes of Table 2, all o f Riga’s administrative districts are collapsed into a single observation, for 
presumably workers can get to jobs anywhere within the city limits, so that the capital city is a single integrated       16
Table 3 presents an alternative, indirect method of measuring monopsony in Latvia, based 
on regional wage differentials.  It includes the result s of log earnings regressions for men and 
women as presented in equation [3]. They provide significant evidence for differences in labor 
markets across Latvia's regions, which supports the contention that Latvia’s labor markets are not 
particularly well - in tegrated, as one would expect with persistent monopsony
6 . These regional 
effects are quite distinct between men and women.  Compared to rural parts of the country and 
controlling for all other differences in individual characteristics, earnings in urban ar eas are 27 
percent higher for men and 15 percent higher for women.  Over and above this general urban 
benefit, men working in Riga receive an additional 14 percent wage premium.  For women, the 
Riga labor market offers wages statistically indistinguishable  from Latvia's other urban areas.  
Compared to the Kurzeme region, earnings in Vidzeme and Latgale are significantly less for both 
men and women.  For example, men and women in Latgale receive earnings 26 percent less than 
in Kurzeme.  This is likely due t o the particularly difficult economic conditions there.    
While some portion of these earnings differentials represents divergent living costs, the 
magnitude of the differences, particularly in a country as geographically small as Latvia, suggests 
a signif icant lack of national labor market integration.  This segmentation suggests that 
monopsony is reasonably prevalent in the economy following the end of central planning.   
The earnings regressions also offer insights into earnings structure more generally.   
Consistent with an extensive human - capital literature, the Latvian labor market rewards those 
                                                                                                                                                            
labor market.  Apart from the Riga district, the average popu lation of these local labor markets is approximately 
50,000 people.  
6  The excluded geographic categories are “rural” and “Kurzeme”.  The “urban” dummy captures the general effect 
of living in any urban area versus living in rural areas, regardless of regio n.  The regional dummies (“Riga 
Region”, “Vidzeme”, “Zemgale” and “Latgale”) reflect earnings differences between Kurzeme and these other 
regions.  Finally, the “Riga City” variable is an interaction term between “urban” and “Riga Region”, thus       17
with more education. While the returns to education are generally larger for women than men, in 
Latvia, the opposite is true.  However, consistent with the findi ngs of Chase (1998) for the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, the returns to general secondary education are larger than those to 
vocational education.   
The earnings analysis also suggests that after controlling for educational differences and 
regions, it is po ssible to discern statistically significant differences only for Russian women, not 
other non - Latvian groups.  While ethnically Russian men and women both receive approximately 
7 percent lower earnings than Latvians,  ceteris paribus , only for women is that  statistically 
significant at the 90 percent confidence interval.  However, this rough measure of discrimination 
does not take into account the ways that human capital might be valued differently for Latvian’s 
and non - Russians.  The section on discriminati on below explores these differences with greater 
analytic sophistication.  
Labor Supply Elasticities Across Groups  
  As noted above, this analysis estimates labor supply elasticity by considering the effect of 
predicted earnings for all respondents on the pr obability that a person participates in the labor 
force.  Table 4 presents estimates of those elasticities.  The positive, statistically significant 
coefficient on predicted earnings suggests that as predicted earnings increase 1 percent, the 
probability t hat a non - Russian will supply labor increases by 1.24 percent.  However, the negative 
significant coefficient ( – 0.086) on the interaction term between predicted earnings and those of 
russian nationality offers evidence that Russians have lower labor supply  elasticity than non -
Russians. While a similar relationship holds in 1996, the coefficient on Russian labor supply 
elasticity is statistically significant only given a 88 percent confidence interval.  That Russians 
                                                                                                                                                            
capturing t he extra benefit to living in Riga, over and above the general differentials for urban areas and for the       18
have lower labor supply elasticity suppor ts the use of a monopsony model to describe wages more 
below their marginal product than that of Latvians.  
Oaxaca Decomposition  
  Like Table 3, Table 5 presents ordinary least squares regressions on log earnings.  
However, rather than stratifying by gender,  it stratifies by ethnicity, providing information about 
the different earnings structures of Russians and Latvians by individual characteristics.  These 
coefficients on earnings measure productivity and help decompose gross earnings differentials into 
exp lained productivity differences and differences attributable to ethnicity alone.  
  Latvians and Russians receive different returns for their human capital characteristics.  
Most notably, returns to education are much higher for Latvians.  Compared to those  with only 
primary education, Latvians with higher education receive 59 percent higher earnings: for 
Russians, the return is only 29 percent.  While general secondary education offers a 17 percent 
return to Latvians, to Russians it offers no statistically s ignificant earnings return.  The age 
earnings profile for Latvians is less steep and less concave than that for Russians, suggesting that 
earnings for Russians away from the prime earnings years drops off much more steeply than for 
Latvians.      
Using thes e stratified earnings regressions, we analyze earnings discrimination between 
Latvian and Russian using a Oaxaca decomposition.  On average
7  working Russians get paid 2.4 
percent more than Latvians, so there does not seem to be earnings discrimination agai nst this 
group.  However, given their observable human capital characteristics of age and education, if 
Russians were paid in the same way as Latvians they would receive 7.9 percent more than 
Latvians.  As a result, Russians are paid 5.5 percent less than  they should be if only their human 
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capital characteristics were considered according to the earnings structure of Latvians.  If the 
Russian earnings structure is used as the standard for appropriate payments to human capital, then 
Russians would be paid 9. 7 percent more than Latvians and the degree of discriminination against 
them would be 7.3 percent.
8  
Another way to consider this same information is to identify average earnings for men if 
they were paid as women and the average earnings of Russians if the y were paid as Latvians.  
Figure 1 presents this information.  If Latvian’s were paid according to a standard established for 
Russians, they would receive 68 Lats per month, while they actually get paid 73 Lats.  Russians, 
who are actually paid 74 Lats per  month, would receive 79 Lats per month if they were paid in the 
same way that Latvians are paid.  
Unemployment Bias  
Beyond this evidence for earnings discrimination, the analysis considers whether or not 
ethnicity biases unemployment.  Cross - tabulations in  Table 6 overview unemployment rates for 
the ILO definition using the LFS 98 data, that based on those who registered as unemployed using 
the LFS 98 data, and the ILO definition using the 1996 data.  There is a large difference between 
unemployment rates w hen measured with the ILO standard (14.5 percent) and when measured by 
unemployment registration (6.9 percent)
9 .  According to these definitions, there was also a large 
drop in the ILO standard unemployment rate between 1996 and 1998: in 1996 the overall 
u nemployment rate was 22.3 percent.  
                                                                                                                                                            
7  Again, these figures are based on the geometric mean.  
8  The “human capital characteristics” on which this analysis is based does not i nclude language ability, for that 
information was not in the data.  Analysts in Latvia suggested that were differences in language included in the 
analysis, discrimination against Russians would be diminished, because Russians’ inability to speak Latvian 
h inders their economic productivity.        20
    According to both definitions, Russians have a higher unemployment rate: 21.0 percent 
versus 10.8 percent for the ILO standard and 8.5 percent versus 6.0 percent for the registration -
based definition. However, the Russi an unemployment rate is proportionately larger when the ILO 
standard definition is used.  As discussed in the Appendix, if many Russians have ambiguous 
citizenship status or previously worked in firms that did not pay social tax, we would expect the 
regist ration - based definition to understate their unemployment.  
The descriptive statistics above indicate the risk factors for unemployment, for 
unemployment rates are higher among Russians, among the young (see Figure 2 for an age 
breakdown of unemployment rate s), and among people living in certain regions (particularly 
Latgale).  However, they do not allow us to decompose carefully the individual characteristics 
that lead one to be more likely to be unemployed.  For example, the Latgale unemployment rate 
could  be particularly high because that region contains a high percentage of Russians, or 
potentially more young people.  To distinguish between these separate effects of individual 
characteristics, we again use probit analysis.  This allows us to determine the  marginal effects of 
different characteristics on the probability that one will be unemployed, controlling for all the 
other characteristics present for an individual.  As such it isolates aspects that unemployment 
policies should focus on.    
Table 7 presen ts probit analyses of the risk factors for unemployment.  To allow 
comparison between the ILO standard definition and a definition based on who registered as 
unemployed, it includes similar probits for both definitions.  To consider whether the risk factor s 
for unemployment have changed across time, it also includes analysis based on the LFS 96 data.  
                                                                                                                                                            
9  The institutional appendix includes information about who is able to register for unemployment benefits, 
presenting the categories of who could be unemployed and still not be able to be included in the official 
unemplo yment statistics.        21
Table 7 includes separate probit analyses for men and women. As Section III noted, to ease 
comparison of marginal probabilities, all the marginal effects acro ss different samples in Table 7 
are evaluated at the same probability.  The standard comparison probability for all columns is that 
for men in the LFS 98 of 13.5 percent.   
Controlling for education and region, those of non - Latvian nationality are significa ntly 
more likely to be unemployed.  On average, being Russian entails a 7 percentage - point increase in 
the risk of being unemployed for men and a 10 percentage - point increase for women.  Those non -
Latvian men of nationality other than Russian are 4 percent age - points more likely to be 
unemployed and non - Latvian women are 6 points more likely.  
After correcting for human capital, nationality and labor demand, differences in regional 
unemployment rates are not particularly large.  Men living in urban areas are  12 percent more 
likely to be unemployed than those in rural areas, while women are 9 percent more likely.  Beyond 
this overall urban increase, the city of Riga has a statistically different unemployment rate: men 
living in Riga are 5 percentage - points more  likely to be unemployed, while women face an 8 
percentage - point higher unemployment risk living there.  Latgale also has an unemployment rate 
significantly different than Kurzeme, where unemployment rates are 9 percentage - points higher 
for men and 5 point s higher for women  
It is particularly interesting that nationality does not have as large an effect on registration 
as it does on unemployment.  Russian and other non - Latvian men are no less likely to register for 
unemployment benefits than Latvian men, ev en though, as seen from the left column, they are 
more likely to be unemployed.  Russian women and women of other nationalities are more likely 
than Latvians to register after controlling for human capital, marital status, and region, though the 
marginal e ffects of nationality on registration are less than on unemployment. Using those who       22
register for benefits as a measure of unemployment underestimates the true effect of nationality, 
particularly for men.  
As mentioned above, the ILO standard unemployment r ate measured in 1996 was much 
higher than in 1998, e.g., 23 versus 16 percent for men and 22 versus 13 percent for women. 
Summarized in the right - most columns of Table 7, different risk factors for unemployment 
generate this overall change in level.  As in  1998, non - Latvian’s unemployment rates were 
significantly larger than Latvians, though the degree that ethnicity influences unemployment is not 
very different between 1996 and 1998.  
Selection into Registration  
Tables 6 and 7 call attention to important di fferences between the official ILO definition of 
unemployment and the Government of the Republic of Latvia’s definition of the registered 
unemployed.  Comparing the first two sets of columns of Table 7, we gain some insight into the 
factors that lead to be ing registered from those who are unemployed.  Table 8 presents direct 
information about the characteristics of those from the pool of unemployed people who choose or 
are able to register with the State Employment Service.  This gives us direct insight int o how the 
definition of unemployment based on registration biases the picture of true unemployment.  
Nationality has an interesting effect on ones ability to register for unemployment benefits.  
In 1998, Russians were 9 percentage - points less likely to regi ster for benefits than Latvians.  
However, in 1996 they were 6 percentage - points more likely to register.  This change suggests 
that the potential to register for non - Latvians in general and Russians in particular lowered 
dramatically during this time peri od.  While there appear to be few increases in Russians’ 
unemployment probabilities, their likelihood of registering for unemployment benefits appears to 
be falling rapidly across time.        23
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Conventional wisdom suggests that ethnic tensions exi sting during central planning but 
were suppressed.  Economic liberalization has allowed those tastes for discrimination to be 
expressed.  However, the lack of perfect competition existing during post - communist transition 
provides an environment that suppor ts discriminatory outcomes.  Revisiting a monopsony 
approach to discrimination, this paper has explored the relationship between the lack of labor 
mobility in Latvia and the observed outcomes of ethnic wage differentials and labor market biases.  
While ther e has been extended discussion over whether a monopsony model is an 
appropriate approach to discrimination in industrialized countries, there are several reasons that 
such a model would be particularly appropriate to post - Communist economies.  During 
Commu nism, given the lack of geographic mobility and the presence of large employers with 
market power in discrete areas, labor markets were likely monopsonistic.  As these economies 
move away from central - planning, monopsony likely persists.  Investment in the se economies is 
unevenly distributed, and there are several impediments to labor mobility.  As a result, 
discrimination during transition can be partially attributed to monopsony, while it also likely 
results from prejudicial tastes that have only recently  been expressed through market 
liberalization.  
Examining discrimination against the Russian minority in Latvia, this paper offers evidence 
for the appropriateness of the monopsony approach.  It is difficult to justify such an approach in 
industrialized cou ntries because of market integration and problematic evidence concerning labor 
supply elasticities: according to the evidence presented, these difficulties do not arise in Latvia.  
Using employment concentration as a direct indicator, the paper offers evid ence of monopsony in 
many local labor markets. Regional dummies in earnings equations show significant regional       24
earnings disparities.  These suggest labor markets in this geographically small economy are not 
particularly well integrated, providing further  indirect evidence of monopsony.  As estimated by 
the earnings effect on participation, Russians have labor supply elasticities significantly lower than 
Latvians.  In the context of monopsony, this would suggest that Russians be paid earnings further 
below  their marginal product than Latvians.  
Earnings decompositions confirm earnings discrimination against the Russian minority.  
Although on average Russians are paid 2.4 percent more than Latvians, correcting for their human 
capital characteristics they shoul d be paid 7.9 percent more, suggesting discrimination of 
approximately 5.5 percent when the Latvian earnings structure is used as the standard of labor 
market productivity.  With the Russian structure as standard, discrimination is 7.3 percent.  
Beyond that  represented by wages, the paper provides evidence of biases in Russians’ 
treatment with regard to unemployment and registration for unemployment benefits.  With most 
of the transition unemployment literature, in Latvia most officially published unemployme nt data 
is based on who registers for benefits.  According to this definition, there is little significant 
difference between Russians and Latvians after correcting for human capital characteristics.  
However, if one analyzes unemployment based on the ILO  definition, there are significant 
differences in the probability of who is unemployed.  Employing a new standardization technique 
to isolate the marginal effects of a particular variable across different groups, the paper illustrates 
that the probability o f becoming unemployed is much higher for Russians using the ILO definition.  
Among the pool of unemployed, those who are selected to register for unemployment 
benefits are much less likely to be Russian,  ceteris paribus .  This may offer some evidence of bia s 
in the regulations concerning benefit registration.  Despite the lower probability of registering for 
unemployment benefits, the paper offers some evidence of longer unemployment spells among       25
Russians.  This reinforces the findings of the literature conc erning unemployment duration during 
transition: benefits packages have little effect on duration.  
While offering support for a monopsony model to consider discrimination during 
transtion, the paper suggests several avenues for future research. With increas ed information 
about the dispersion of firms across Latvia, it would be useful to generate a more region - specific 
monopsony measure.   Further, it would be worthwhile to extend this inquiry to other transition 
economies for comparison.  Using this geograph ic variation, it would be interesting to analyse 
whether earnings discrimination varies by the degree of monopsony, as we would expect.  
Further, with improved labor supply measures, it might be worthwhile to directly link elasticity to 
wage differentials.   These innovations will be incorporated into future research, establishing more 
thoroughly how much a monopsony approach describes discrimination against ethnic minorities 
during post - Communist transition.        26
Institutional Appendix 
Latvia’s Unemployment Registration 
 
According to the Law on Employment, in Latvia those who are granted official 
unemployment status must:  
¤ Be citizens of the Republic of Latvia or residents who have a permanent residence permit and 
a stamp of the population register in their passp orts;  
¤ Be of working age;  
¤ Be able to work;  
¤ Not receive any salary or incomes of any kind of at least the size of the minimum wage;  
¤ Not undertake any business activities;  
¤ Be looking for a job;  
¤ Be registered with the state employment service associated with h is or her place of permanent 
residence; and  
¤ At least once a month, visit the state employment service.  
 
While many of its elements overlap with the ILO standard, under this definition, a person 
must register with the state employment service to gain unempl oyment status.  These 
unemployment offices register those who
10 :  
¤ Have a stamp in their passports certifying that they live in the same jurisdiction as the 
employment office;  
¤ Have received a labor registration document from their last employer certifying the y no longer 
have a job; and   
¤ Worked for an employer who paid social tax for nine of the previous 12 months.  
 
As a result of these regulations, in Latvia one can identify several groups who cannot 
register as unemployed, even though they meet the ILO standa rd unemployment definition.  For 
example, this definition of registration would exclude:   
¤ Those with disputed Latvian citizenship, a situation arising given ambiguity about the rights of 
ethnic Russians or non - Latvian speakers;  
¤ Those who have moved to a re gion of Latvia other than where their passports say they live, 
such as those who leave their homes in search of work;  
¤ Those whose last employer faced financial difficulties before laying workers off, for those 
employers might be unable to pay social tax re gularly in the 12 months prior to laying off 
workers;   
¤ Those whose last job was as a self - employed worker or in a small entrepreneurial firm that 
would not issue labor registration documents;   
                                                  
10  Across countries, it is reasonably standard to stipulate conditions like these to register for unemployment 
benefits.  For example, in the United States the regulations concerning eligibility for unemployment insurance are 
variable and  complex.  Each state has its own eligibility requirements that are generally based on arcane bodies of 
legislation.  It is generally beyond an individual citizen to ascertain whether or not she is eligible for benefits.  
Rather questions about eligibility  are refered to administrative specialists.        27
¤ Those choosing not to visit the state employment service once a  month, perhaps because its 
benefits or services are unattractive; or  
¤ Those unaware of the requirements necessary to register as unemployed.    
These stipulations for registration create the potential for biased coverage in unemployment 
benefits.        28
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Figure 2 
Unemployment Rates by Age
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
     Household Budget  Labor Force      Labor Force 
     Survey 1997:Q1      Survey 1998:Q1      Survey 1996:Q2 
      Women  Men      Women  Men      Women  Men 
  Earnings: main job (lats/mo.)    74.47  95.47      -.-  -.-      -.-  -.- 
       [Log Variance]    [0.345]  [0.387]                 
  HUMAN CAPITAL                       
  Higher Education    24.8%  19.5%      -.-  -.-      -.-  -.- 
  Secondary Education    66.5%  61.8%      -.-  -.-      -.-  -.- 
  Vocational Education    2.4%  7.5%      -.-  -.-      -.-  -.- 
  Primary Education    6.2%  10.4%      -.-  -.-      -.-  -.- 
  Less than Primary    0.2%  0.8%      -.-  -.-      -.-  -.- 
  Higher Education    -.-  -.-      12.2%  10.1%      13.0%  10.8% 
  Secondary Specialized    -.-  -.-      19.7%  18.0%      22.6%  19.7% 
  Technical Secondary    -.-  -.-      7.0%  12.2%      6.8%  13.3% 
  Comprehensive Secondary    -.-  -.-      23.6%  19.5%      22.0%  18.7% 
  Vocational Education    -.-  -.-      1.9%  5.9%      1.8%  5.3% 
  Basic Education    -.-  -.-      22.6%  25.0%      21.7%  23.3% 
  Less than Basic    -.-  -.-      11.9%  8.9%      10.9%  8.3% 
  No Formal Education    -.-  -.-      1.0%  0.4%      1.2%  0.6% 
  Age    40.2  40.0            47.7         43.6           46.1         42.1  
     (Standard Deviation)    (11.3)  (12.8)       (19.5)    (17.9)        (18.5)    (17.1)  
  NATIONALITY                       
  Latvian     59.3%  59.4%      61.9%  62.9%      58.8%  59.7% 
  Russian    30.3%  30.7%      27.0%  26.0%      29.1%  28.3% 
  Other Nationalities    10.3%  9.8%      11.2%  11.1%      12.1%  12.1% 
  MARITAL STATUS                       
  Married    65.9%  80.1%      52.3%  63.7%      56.0%  65.4% 
  Single    14.4%  16.0%      20.5%  26.7%      18.5%  25.8% 
  Divorced    13.3%  3.2%      9.2%  5.4%      9.2%  5.6% 
  Widowed    6.4%  0.8%      17.9%  4.2%      16.2%  3.2% 
  REGION                       
  Riga City    35.4%  37.5%      23.6%  22.5%      29.1%  27.4% 
  Riga Region    15.3%  13.8%      10.6%  10.8%      10.3%  10.3% 
  Kurzene    12.2%  15.1%      16.4%  16.7%      14.0%  14.5% 
  Vidzeme    10.3%  11.2%      16.6%  16.6%      16.6%  17.7% 
  Zemgale    13.0%  11.3%      14.5%  13.8%      13.7%  13.5% 
  Latgale    13.8%  11.2%      18.4%  19.7%      16.3%  16.5% 
  Urban    78.4%  75.6%      60.3%  57.7%      61.2%  59.1% 
                         
  Number of Observations    933  914      8304  6844      6221  5265 
      
Table 2 
Employment Concentration 
Percentage of Non-Farm Workers by District 
 Employed by Specific Industries 
 
Indicator  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Top Three Industries  48.0%  6.78  31.3%  60.3% 
Top Two Industries  36.0%  6.13  22.1%  49.0% 
Top Industry  21.5%  5.15  11.8%  32.7% 
N(Districts)  32          
Note: "Specific Industry" defined by 2-digit SIC codes.   
      
Table 3 
Determinants of (Log) Earnings: Men vs. Women 
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
(Absolute Values for T-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
    Men      Women   
HUMAN CAPITAL (vs. Primary)             
  Higher Education    0.54**      0.46**   
    (7.62)      (5.68)   
  Secondary Education    0.23**      0.028   
    (3.69)      (0.38)   
  Vocational Education    0.11      0.15   
    (1.32)      (1.10)   
  Age    0.023**      0.040**   
    (2.25)      (3.42)   
  Age Squared  (x 100)   -0.033**      -0.052**   
    (2.83)      (3.76)   
NATIONALITY (vs. Latvian)             
  Russian    -0.066      -0.069*   
    (1.53)      (1.64)   
  Other Nationality    -0.030      -0.094   
    (0.47)      (1.52)   
MARITAL STATUS (vs. Married)             
  Single    -0.29**      -0.071   
    (4.48)      (1.14)   
  Divorced    -0.17*      -0.009   
    (1.64)      (0.17)   
  Widowed    -0.15      0.12   
    (0.71)      (1.53)   
REGION (vs. Kurzeme)             
  Riga City    0.14**      -0.045   
    (2.37)      (0.73)   
  Riga Region    0.065      -0.021   
    (0.95)      (0.30)   
  Vidzeme    -0.21**      -0.15**   
    (2.91)      (2.01)   
  Zemgale    -0.03      -0.077   
    (0.42)      (1.08)   
  Latgale    -0.26**      -0.26**   
    (3.53)      (3.71)   
  Urban    0.27**      0.15**   
    (5.52)      (3.01)   
             
Constant    3.70**      3.34**   
    (16.70)      (13.25)   
             
N    914      933   
R-squared    0.24      0.16   
*Statistically significant .10 level; ** statistically significant .05 level    Data Source: 1997 Household Budget Survey   
      
Table 4 
Determinants of the Probability of Participating in the Labor Force 
Probit Estimates 
(Z-scores in Parentheses) 
 
    Participation 1998  Participation 1996 
               
  Predicted Earnings (Log)    1.24**      1.09**   
      (55.81)      (44.25)   
               
  Earnings * Russian    -0.086**      -0.057   
      (2.60)      (1.57)   
               
  Russian    0.34**      0.25*   
      (2.90)      (1.84)   
               
  Male     -0.059**      -0.022   
      (6.10)      (2.05)   
  REGION (vs. Kurzeme)             
    Riga City    -0.059**      -0.039**   
      (3.66)      (2.19)   
    Riga Region    -0.016      -0.023   
      (0.91)      (1.10)   
    Vidzeme    0.21**      0.19**   
      (13.97)      (11.28)   
    Zemgale    0.056**      0.053**   
      (3.41)      (2.87)   
    Latgale    0.21**      0.20**   
      (13.67)      (12.00)   
    Urban    -0.30**      -0.19**   
      (26.74)      (15.39)   
               
  Number of Observations    15148      11486   
  Log-Likelihood    -7380.6      -5750.0   
  Observed Probability    0.576      0.619   
  Predicted Probability    0.590      0.647   
  *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at .05 level   
  Data Source: Labor Force Surveys             
      
Table 5 
Determinants of (Log) Earnings: Latvians vs. Russians 
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions 
(Absolute Values for T-Statistics in Parentheses) 
 
   Latvian      Russian   
HUMAN CAPITAL (vs. Primary)             
  Higher Education    0.59**      0.29**   
    (8.69)      (2.73)   
  Secondary Education    0.17**     -0.023   
    (2.70)      (0.24)   
  Vocational Education    0.029      0.052   
    (0.31)      (0.38)   
  Age    0.027**     0.048**   
    (2.77)      (3.26)   
  Age Squared  (x 100)   -0.038**     -0.062**   
    (3.41)      (3.48)   
MALE    0.27**      0.32**   
    (7.56)      (7.13)   
MARITAL STATUS (vs. Married)             
  Single    -0.20**     -0.17**   
    (3.50)      (2.14)   
  Divorced    -0.035     -0.087   
    (0.52)      (1.11)   
  Widowed    0.091     -0.025   
    (0.90)      (0.23)   
REGION (vs. Kurzeme)             
  Riga City    0.069     -0.053   
    (1.23)      (0.70)   
  Riga Region    0.091      -0.13   
    (1.47)      (1.47)   
  Vidzeme    -0.16**     -0.39**   
    (2.51)      (2.55)   
  Zemgale    0.031     -0.33**   
    (0.49)      (3.10)   
  Latgale    -0.22**     -0.37**   
    (3.10)      (4.13)   
  Urban    0.20**      0.23**   
    (4.89)      (2.96)   
             
Constant    3.41**      3.22**   
    (15.79)     (10.01)   
             
N    1097      564   
R-squared    0.22      0.26        
Table 6 
Unemployment Rates 
By Gender, Unemployment Definition and Year 
 
    UE (ILO) 1998  UE (Reg.) 1998  UE (ILO) 1996 
  LATVIA  14.5%  6.9%  22.6% 
    Men  15.6%  6.2%  23.0% 
    Women  13.3%  7.6%  22.1% 
         
  NATIONALITY       
    Latvian  10.8%  6.0%  17.4% 
    Russian  21.0%  8.5%  29.2% 
         
  GEOGRAPHIC AREA       
    Urban  17.5%  7.6%  25.1% 
    Riga City  17.6%  5.3%  25.0% 
    Riga Region  11.7%  3.3%  20.5% 
    Kurzeme  11.3%  5.8%  19.9% 
    Vidzeme  11.0%  7.0%  18.4% 
    Zemgale  12.3%  6.6%  21.7% 
    Latgale  18.5%  16.0%  26.1% 
         
  AGE GROUP       
    <25  26.5%  11.8%  33.7% 
    25-35  12.6%  6.2%  21.4% 
    35-45  12.9%  6.4%  18.6% 
    45-55  14.3%  7.3%  18.8% 
    55-65  10.9%  5.1%  24.6% 
  Data Source: Labor Force Survey     
      
Table 7 
Determinants of the Probability of Being Unemployed 
Probit Estimates by Gender, Unemployment Definition, and Year 
(Z-Scores in Parentheses) 
 
    UE (ILO) 1998    UE (Registered) 1998  UE (ILO) 1996   
     Men  Women      Men  Women      Men  Women   
  HUMAN CAPITAL (vs. <Primary)                         
    Higher Education    -0.14**  -0.11**      -0.15**  -0.12**      -0.13**  -0.13**   
      (9.59)  (5.39)      (6.45)  (5.05)      (9.13)  (8.33)   
    Secondary Specialized    -0.12**  -0.068**      -0.11**  -0.068**      -0.11**  -0.096**   
      (8.36)  (3.20)      (5.83)  (2.81)      (8.06)  (5.92)   
    Technical Secondary    -0.084**  -0.037      -0.067**  -0.049*      -0.080**  -0.074**   
      (5.80)  (1.52)      (3.17)  (1.79)      (5.48)  (3.67)   
    Comprehensive Secondary    -0.069**  0.000      -0.044**  -0.026      -0.057**  -0.047**   
      (4.87)  (0.02)      (2.18)  (1.07)      (3.78)  (2.66)   
    Vocational Education    -0.060**  -0.011      -0.041  -0.013      -0.009  0.001   
      (3.00)  (0.28)      (1.51)  (0.28)      (0.39)  (0.03)   
                           
    Age     -0.005*  -0.009**      -0.001  0.003      -0.012**  -0.016**   
      (1.77)  (3.18)      (0.42)  (0.68)      (5.24)  (7.03)   
    Age Squared (x100)    0.004  0.006*      0.001  -0.007      0.012**  0.019**   
      (1.30)  (1.84)      (0.24)  (1.52)      (4.49)  (6.87)   
  NATIONALITY (vs. Latvian)                         
    Russian    0.066**  0.10**      -0.011  0.077**      0.072**  0.097**   
      (5.27)  (7.26)      (0.74)  (4.64)      (5.65)  (6.80)   
    Other Nationality    0.039**  0.058**      0.012  0.043*      0.050**  0.11**   
      (2.19)  (2.86)      (0.53)  (1.80)      (2.83)  (5.50)   
  LABOR DEMAND                         
    Long-Term Job Growth    -0.16**  -0.044      -0.10**  -0.12      0.026  0.017   
      (2.34)  (0.58)      (3.07)  (1.39)      (0.32)  (0.20)   
    Vacancy/Employment Ratio    -0.60  -6.690      -13.13**  -3.96      8.48*  -6.31   
      (0.15)  (1.45)      (2.44)  (1.41)      (1.94)  (1.21)   
  REGION (vs. Rural & Kurzeme)                         
    Riga City    0.048*  0.078**      0.10**  0.025      -0.011  0.024   
      (1.65)  (2.23)      (2.35)  (0.71)      (0.50)  (0.92)   
    Riga Region    0.017  0.024      -0.022  -0.035      0.066**  -0.048**   
      (0.79)  (0.99)      (0.71)  (1.37)      (2.84)  (2.48)   
    Vidzeme    0.014  0.058**      0.052*  0.064**      0.044*  -0.022   
      (0.60)  (2.17)      (1.65)  (2.14)      (1.96)  (1.02)   
    Zemgale    0.019  0.014      0.065*  0.023      0.022  -0.028   
      (0.80)  (0.54)      (1.89)  0.78       (1.01)  (1.43)   
    Latgale    0.091**  0.052**      0.23**  0.11**      0.091**  0.023   
      (3.76)  (2.01)      (6.58)  (3.68)      (3.78)  (1.01)   
    Urban    0.12**  0.088**      0.094**  0.055**      0.050**  0.062**   
      (8.95)  (6.42)      (5.80)  (4.03)      (4.90)  (5.00)   
                           
  Number of Observations    4507  4230      4148  4025      3727  3380   
  Log-Likelihood    -1792.8  -1511.0      -856.3  -998.8      -1869.2  -1628.6   
  Observed Probability    0.156  0.133      0.062  0.076      0.230  0.221   
  Comparison Probability1    0.135  0.135      0.135  0.135      0.135  0.135   
  *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at .05 level           
  1 Marginal effects for all sub-samples are compared at the predicted probability for the male 1998 sub-sample. 
  Data Source: Labor Force Survey                              
Table 8 
Selection into Registered Unemployed 
Probit Estimates by Year 
(Z-scores in parentheses) 
 
      1998      1996   
  MALE    -0.12**     -0.069**   
      (4.03)      (2.97)   
  HUMAN CAPITAL (vs. <Primary)             
    Higher Education    -0.074      -0.041   
      (1.18)      (0.89)   
    Secondary Specialized    0.018      -0.036   
      (0.36)      (1.04)   
    Technical Secondary    -0.015      0.018   
      (0.30)      (0.45)   
    Comprehensive Secondary    -0.005      -0.045   
      (0.11)      (1.37)   
    Vocational Education    0.026      0.041   
      (0.34)      (0.72)   
               
    Age     0.019**      0.032**   
      (2.44)      (5.49)   
    Age Squared (x100)    -0.022**     -0.043**   
      (2.17)      (5.84)   
  NATIONALITY (vs. Latvian)             
    Russian    -0.093**      0.057**   
      (2.88)      (2.14)   
    Other Nationality    -0.070      0.029   
      (1.51)      (0.83)   
  REGION (vs. Rural & Kurzeme)             
    Riga City    -0.18**      -0.16**   
      (3.73)      (4.29)   
    Riga Region    -0.21**     -0.085**   
      (3.78)      (2.01)   
    Vidzeme    -0.012     -0.096**   
      (0.19)      (2.24)   
    Zemgale    0.005      0.080*   
      (0.08)      (1.73)   
    Latgale    0.23**      0.091**   
      (3.99)      (2.03)   
    Urban    -0.054      -0.016   
      (1.21)      (0.53)   
               
  Number of Observations    1140      1516   
  Log-Likelihood    -658.5      -788.0   
  Observed Probability    0.353      0.264   
  Predicted Probability    0.337      0.236   
  Data Source: Labor Force Survey             
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